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Introduction
Trust plays a pivotal role in many aspects 
of our lives, as it represents a necessary 
ingredient to coordinate and smooth social 
relationships (Cook, 2001). However, peo-
ple’s actions and decisions in everyday life 
offer numerous opportunities for violating 
trust (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006), 
and ample research has shown that such 
trust breaches may lead to pervasive and 
persistent negative consequences (e.g., see 
Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan, & Murnighan, 
2008). In many situations, perpetrators try 
to restore broken trust by the offer of a mon-
etary reimbursement to the victim. Previous 
research regarding the effectiveness of finan-
cial compensation mainly explored compen-
sation that is smaller than or equivalent to 
the damage suffered. On the basis of these 
studies (e.g., see Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, 
& Murnighan, 2002; also see Desmet, De 
Cremer, & van Dijk, 2011), it was concluded 
that financial compensation is an effective 
tool in restoring a victim’s trust. Some schol-
ars have, however, argued that restoring bro-
ken trust may ask more from a perpetrator 
than just exactly restoring the damage (e.g., 
Kim et al., 2006). When the compensation 
offered by the perpetrator is of greater value 
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Recent research revealed that despite its financial costs, overcompensation is not 
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than the financial loss suffered by the victim, 
we speak of overcompensation. 
Because overcompensation implies addi-
tional costs on top of the expenses of com-
pensation that exactly covers the loss suffered 
(i.e., equal compensation), it is costly for the 
perpetrator, but at the same time profitable 
for the victim. From such an economic per-
spective it is surprising that recent research 
has shown that overcompensation does not 
provide any surplus value beyond the level 
of equal compensation, and that it may 
even provoke adverse effects. Specifically, 
overcompensation results in lower levels of 
trust repair and less favorable perceptions 
of the perpetrator than equal compensation 
(Haesevoets, Van Hiel, Reinders Folmer, & 
De Cremer, 2014). These results are consist-
ent with fairness literature (Engelmann & 
Strobel, 2004), which has shown that peo-
ple prefer equal outcomes (cf. equal com-
pensation) above unequal outcomes (cf. 
the advantageous inequality that results 
from overcompensation; see Loewenstein, 
Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). 
Importantly, all previous studies regarding 
the effectiveness of financial overcompensa-
tion merely focused on the target of the com-
pensation, thereby overlooking the potential 
positive influences that overcompensation 
may have on non-involved observing par-
ties. Indeed, perpetrators often offer victims 
an overcompensation, not only to repair 
their relationship with the victim, but also 
to avoid reputational damage and to posi-
tively influence the ‘general public’, like for 
instance when a company offers a dissatis-
fied customer a refund, a coupon, or a prod-
uct replacement that is worth more than the 
original purchase price (for a meta-analysis 
on this matter, see Gelbrich & Roschk, 2011).
In the present research, we investigated 
whether target-observer differences exist in 
the effectiveness of financial (over)compen-
sation as a trust repair strategy. Specifically, 
in line with the results of Haesevoets et al. 
(2014) we hypothesized that for targets, over-
compensation is less effective to repair trust 
than equal compensation (Hypothesis 1). 
With regard to observers, we formulated two 
competing hypotheses. According to fairness 
literature, people evaluate and react not only 
to the unfairness that they personally expe-
rience, but also to the fairness experienced 
by others (cf. O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011; Zhu, 
Martens, & Aquino, 2012). Hence, since over-
compensation fails to restore equality in 
outcomes, a first possibility is that – similar 
to targets − overcompensation is also less 
effective than equal compensation to repair 
observers’ trust (Hypothesis 2a). However, 
based on the affective forecasting literature 
(for an overview, see Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), 
it can be expected that observers are unable 
to adequately forecast their reactions to over-
compensation as they lack direct involve-
ment, and therefore experience it differently 
than targets. More precisely, it can be argued 
that people have to experience the advan-
tageous inequality that overcompensation 
entails themselves for overcompensation 
to result in lower levels of trust. Following 
this reasoning, it can be expected that for 
observers overcompensation has no posi-
tive nor negative effects and thus results in 
similar levels of trust as equal compensation 
(Hypothesis 2b). 
Method
Participants and Design
One hundred fifteen undergraduate stu-
dents at Ghent University (75% female, 
Mage = 19.05, SD = 1.74) participated in an 
experiment for course credits. We employed 
a 2 (perspective: target versus observer) ×3 
(compensation size: no compensation versus 
equal compensation versus overcompensa-
tion) between-subjects design. 
Procedure
Participants were invited in groups of 12 per-
sons. Upon arrival in the laboratory, partici-
pants were informed they would participate 
in a decision task. It was explained that in this 
task an allocator and a recipient must decide 
over the division of a certain amount of 
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money. In the target conditions, participants 
were told that they would play this task in 
the role of recipient with another player pre-
sent in the lab who would be assigned to the 
role of allocator. In the observer conditions, 
participants learnt that they would observe 
a task that takes place between two other 
players (i.e., an allocator and a recipient) who 
were present in the lab. 
Before the start of the task, all participants 
received a budget of €20. To induce a sense 
of ownership over the money that was going 
to be divided during the task, both the alloca-
tor and the recipient (but not the observer) 
had to cede €5 of their budget. The allocator 
would then unilaterally divide this €10. The 
recipient could not influence this division, 
and thus had to accept the money offered by 
the allocator. The trust violation was opera-
tionalized by means of an unfair allocation of 
the resources. That is, the allocator was pre-
programmed to allocate €1 to recipient and 
to keep the remaining €9 for him- or herself. 
To examine whether this division is per-
ceived as a transgression by the recipient, we 
asked participants in the target conditions to 
indicate their satisfaction with the distribu-
tion by selecting one of two messages to send 
to the allocator (i.e., “I am satisfied with how 
you divided the money” or “I am not satisfied 
with how you divided the money”). In the 
observer conditions, participants observed 
the recipient sending the message that he or 
she was not satisfied with the division. In the 
target conditions, four participants (3.5%) 
indicated that they were satisfied with the 
division, and thus did not experience it as 
a transgression. For these participants the 
experiment ended at this point. The remain-
ing 111 participants (96.5%) proceeded to 
the compensation size manipulation.
In the target conditions, the participants 
themselves received or did not receive com-
pensation from the allocator, while in the 
observer conditions the participants observed 
another person (i.e., the recipient) receiving 
compensation (or not). In the no compensa-
tion conditions, the allocator did not give 
additional money to the recipient. In the 
equal compensation conditions, the allocator 
gave the recipient €4 extra. Finally, in the 
overcompensation conditions, the allocator 
offered the recipient an additional €14 (for a 
more detailed description of this procedure, 
see Haesevoets et al., 2014). 
Measures
Trust. Participants’ trust in the allocator was 
measured using the six item trust scale of 
Desmet et al. (2011). A sample item is: “I trust 
the allocator” (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally 
agree; α = .87). 
Manipulation Checks. To examine whether 
the perspective manipulation was success-
ful, we used two items: “To what extent were 
you the recipient of the compensation?” and 
“To what extent was another person than 
you the recipient of the compensation?”. 
Moreover, to investigate the effectiveness of 
the compensation size manipulation, par-
ticipants were asked: “To what extent was 
the compensation greater than the damage 
caused by the unequal division of the alloca-
tor?”. These three manipulation checks were 
all measured on a scale form 1 (not at all) to 
7 (very much). 
Results
Manipulation Checks
First, we tested the effectiveness of the per-
spective manipulation using two one-sample 
t tests. The results for the first manipulation 
check revealed that for the target conditions 
the sample mean of 4.80 (SD = 1.62) signifi-
cantly deviates from the scale’s theoretical 
midpoint, t(55) = 3.71, p < .001. Similarly, for 
the second manipulation check the analysis 
revealed that for the observer conditions the 
sample mean of 4.58 (SD = 1.61) also signifi-
cantly differs from the value of 4, t(54) = 2.69, 
p = .01. The effectiveness of the compensa-
tion size manipulation was subsequently 
tested using a 2 (perspective) × 3 (compensa-
tion size) ANOVA. As expected, participants 
indicated more often that the compensation 
was greater than the damage caused by the 
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unequal division in the overcompensation 
conditions (M = 6.34, SD = 0.97) than in the 
equal compensation conditions (M = 2.26, SD 
= 1.41) and the no compensation conditions 
(M = 1.44, SD = 0.89), F(2, 105) = 180.14, p < 
.001, η²p = .77. A post hoc test (LSD) showed 
that the mean scores of the three compensa-
tion sizes significantly differ from each other 
(all ps < .005). The main effect of perspective 
and the interaction effect of perspective × 
compensation size were non-significant, F(1, 
105) = 0.40, p = .531, η²p = .00 and F(2, 105) = 
0.22, p = .806, η²p = .00, respectively.
Trust
A 2 (perspective) × 3 (compensation size) 
ANOVA on the trust scale showed a non-
significant main effect of perspective, F(1, 
105) = 0.01, p = .94, η²p = .00, a significant 
main effects of compensation size, F(2, 105) 
= 30.69, p < .001, η²p = .37, and a signifi-
cant interaction effect of perspective × com-
pensation size, F(2, 105) = 4.76, p = .011, 
η²p = .08. This interaction effect was fur-
ther explored using planned comparisons. 
Within both the target and the observer 
conditions, a significant effect of compen-
sation size emerged, F(2, 105) = 27.19, p < 
.001, η²p = .34 and F(2, 105) = 8.39, p < .001, 
η²p = .14, respectively. Specifically, for both 
targets and observers, equal compensation 
(M = 4.51, SD = 0.79 and M = 3.80, SD = 
0.96, respectively) and overcompensation 
(M = 3.51, SD = 0.97 and M = 3.80, SD = 
0.79, respectively) resulted in higher levels 
of trust (both ps < .001) compared to no 
compensation (M = 2.31, SD = 1.02 and M 
= 2.69, SD = 0.69, respectively). Further, in 
line with Hypothesis 1, overcompensation is 
less effective to repair trust (p < .001) than 
equal compensation for targets. Moreover, 
as predicted by Hypothesis 2b (and opposite 
to the predictions made in the competing 
Hypotheses 2a), for observers no signifi-
cant difference (p = .986) between equal 
and overcompensation occurred. Figure 1 
depicts the means trust scores with 95% CI 
error bars for each condition.
Discussion
We replicated the finding of Haesevoets et 
al. (2014) that despite its considerable costs 
for the perpetrator and its profitability for 
the victim, overcompensation has negative 
effects on the target’s trust in the perpetra-
tor (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, we also supple-
ment the current literature by showing that 
for non-involved observing parties, overcom-
pensation is neither more (nor less) effective 
than equal compensation to re-establish bro-
ken trust (Hypothesis 2b). The latter result 
can possibly be ascribed to the inability of 
observers to accurately predict their reaction 
towards overcompensation (see the affec-
tive forecasting literature; Wilson & Gilbert, 
2003), which seems to align with the idea 
that people must experience the inequality 
that results from overcompensation them-
selves for it to result in a decrease of trust. 
However, although overcompensation does 
not entail adverse effects, it also has no addi-
tional effect on top of equal compensation 
in terms of perceived trustworthiness among 
observing parties. Our results therefore show 
that overcompensation is not a cost-effective 
tool to repair broken trust, certainly not for 
the target of overcompensation, but neither 
for members of the public. 
An important recommendation for further 
research is to investigate whether these find-
ings also emerge in the context of customer 
services, as financial compensation is one of 
Figure 1: Means trust scores with 95% CI 
error bars.
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the most widely used strategies in service 
recovery (Davidow, 2003). Previous research 
in this domain has shown that after a prod-
uct failure, overcompensation has few, if any, 
positive effects on the target of the compen-
sation (i.e., the dissatisfied customer; see the 
meta-analysis of Gelbrich & Roschk, 2011). 
However, despite the absence of positive 
effects of overcompensation on targets, com-
panies may generously reimburse dissatisfied 
customers by providing overcompensation in 
order to positively influence the general pub-
lic’s image of the company, like through the 
creation of positive word-of-mouth which can 
in turn attract new customers. In this vein, 
it is surprisingly that, at least to our knowl-
edge, no previous research in the domain 
of customer services investigated whether 
overcompensation has indeed positive effects 
on observing third parties. However, if our 
finding that overcompensation as a means 
to resolve a transgression at the interper-
sonal level entails no positive consequences 
− not for targets nor for observers − would 
also apply to consumer settings, companies 
should critically assess the use of financial 
overcompensation as a restoration strategy 
for a product or service failure.
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